

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

EXCISE

38

35-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Action  
SCA

Control: 2415

Rec'd: November 7, 1962  
1:36 p.m.

R

FROM: Belgrade

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 625, November 7, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

CLEARCERT

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS NAVY

I discussed CLEARCERT problem this morning with Nikezic and outlined to him procedures under which we would be prepared to handle matter here in Yugo, along lines indicated MYTEL 609 and DEPTTEL 439.

Department may be interested in certain questions he placed and my replies.

1. He asked about regime which would prevail in case of vessels originally sailing from Yugo but calling at other ports and taking on further cargo en route to Cuba. I told him I could not give him definite answer but thought following would be probabilities. If vessel called at bloc port or port of noncommitted nation heavily engaged in shipping to Cuba, our authorities would have to be quite rigorous in satisfying themselves no prohibited as being taken. If vessel called only at African or Asian port from which no CLEARCERT would normally be required, I doubted that further formalities would be required, though it might be necessary that masters identify to our naval control, on demand, those items on manifest which had been added at intermediate port of call. In case of ports of Atlantic Pact countries or other countries in close association with us, I said it was my hope:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

REVIEWED by Fulbright Date 11/14/80

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(☐) EXCISE (☐) DECLASSIFY IN PART  
(☐) DENY (☐) Non-responsive info.

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RMR

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my hope that lenient treatment could be accorded, provided we had adequate means of knowing what kind of additional cargo was being taken on in those ports. However, I thought entire question of treatment Yugo vessels leaving non-Yugo ports for Cuba might be influenced by attitude of GOY toward CLEARCERT arrangements as a whole and I could therefore say nothing definite.

2. He asked how this procedure compared to that accorded to western and other countries. I said that in case of bloc countries I was sure we would insist on physical inspection. For countries allied with or in close association with us, I thought regime to be applied would be in essence no different from that being applied to Yugo except that with respect to those countries we would be showing greater lenience on basis their known political attitude toward us and nature of political associations, whereas in case of GOY we would be relying on my own personal relationship with him and Foreign Minister and my confidence in their integrity. I emphasized in this connection that Yugo was a socialist country which had shown itself sympathetic to Castro regime in recent tensions and difficulties, and said that this would normally have been considered to warrant and require full physical inspection GOY vessels clearing from Yugo ports to Cuba. If we were willing to contemplate other arrangements, it was in sincere desire to avoid raising for them problems which I knew would be delicate in view of their unusual position.

In conclusion Nikezic said that while he appreciated my efforts to shape their arrangements in manner which would make them acceptable there, he thought if possible his government might prefer to have its ships submitted to stoppage and search at sea (presumably under protest) rather than recognize

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-3- 625, November 7, 4 p.m. from Belgrade

recognize our right to issue anything resembling a visa or permit covering movement such ships to Cuba. I said this was their choice; that CLEARCERT system had been devised only as convenience to others if they wished to take advantage of it; in any case I wanted him to note we had done everything possible to make system possible and easy of acceptance for GOY.

*Yell*  
Comment: I personally think it likely Yugos may reject entire system and prefer to accept inspection at sea under protest. However, I felt that suggestions I was permitted to make to Nikezic place us in very strong position and will make it impossible in any case for Yugos to make martyrs of themselves.

Would appreciate any information available on attitude other "nonaligned" countries.

KENNAN

SGC

NOTE: Advance copy to SCA 11-7-62 CWO-M

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